This paper examines the accuracy of state revenue forecasting under a flexible loss function. Previous research focused on whether a forecast is rational, meaning unbiased and actual forecast errors being uncorrelated with information available at the time the forecast. These traditional tests assumed that the forecast loss function is quadratic and symmetric. The literature found budget forecasts often under-predicted revenue and use available information inefficiently. Using California data, I draw the same conclusion using similar tests. However, the rejection of forecast rationality might be the result of an asymmetric loss function. Once the asymmetry of the loss function is taken into account using a flexible loss function, I find evidence that under-forecasting is less costly than over-forecasting California's revenues. I also find the forecast errors that take this asymmetry into account are independent of information available at the time of the forecast. These results indicate that failure to control for possible asymmetry in the loss function in previous work may have produced misleading results. * I would like to thank Shirley Svorny for helpful comments.
INTRODUCTION
Sound state government budget planning requires accurate revenue forecasts. used a rational expectations approach as a basis for evaluating the accuracy of state revenue forecasts. 1 Underlying any forecast is the loss function of the forecaster. The tests used by and others assumed forecast loss functions are quadratic and symmetric. This means the cost of over-predicting revenues is the same as under-predicting revenues. The literature finds there is a tendency for forecasts to under-predict revenues and use available information inefficently. However, systematic under-prediction of revenues can be rational if the forecast loss function is asymmetric, where the costs of under-prediction differ (or are less) than over-predicting revenues. This possibility suggests the literature's rejection of revenue forecast rationality might be wrong.
A rational revenue forecasts should be unbiased and forecast errors uncorrelated with information available at the time of the forecast. They rejected forecast rationality in their analysis. This paper addresses the issue by first conducting tests using data from California that examine whether the revenue forecasts are unbiased and efficiently use available information assuming a symmetric loss function like the previous literature.
I then adopt a method to test rationality developed by Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmermann (2005) . Their approach uses a flexible forecast loss function where symmetry is a special case. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the researcher to estimate an asymmetry parameter to determine whether revenue forecasters view the costs associated with an under-prediction as being the same as an over-prediction of revenues. Within this framework it is also possible to test whether forecasters have successfully incorporated available information into their forecasts.
Revenue forecasting accuracy is important because forecast errors can be politically and administratively costly. An over prediction of revenues can force program expenditure cuts or unpopular tax increases during the fiscal year. Under-predicting revenues results in the underfunding of essential programs and implies taxes may be too high in the state. Both types of forecast errors require midcourse adjustments in the budget. In some situations, "unexpected" revenues that result from under-predicting might be a way to increase the discretionary spending power of the governor. Finally, both types of forecast errors generate bad press that can impact election results.
Bretchshneider and Schroeder (1988), , Rogers and Joyce (1996) argue that the political and administrative costs associated with overestimating are greater than for underestimating tax revenues.
Using different states and time periods, , Gentry (1989), Bretchshneider, Gorr, Grizzle, and , and Rogers and Joyce (1996) all find state revenue forecasters tend to under-predict. This is referred to as the "conservative bias" in revenue forecasting. In contrast, Cassidy, Kamlet, and Nagin (1989) and Macan and Azad (1995) do not find significant bias in state revenue forecasts. , , and Macan and Azad (1995) find forecast errors to be correlated with economic information available at the time the forecast, suggesting forecasts could be improved with a more efficient use of economic data.
I examine revenue forecasts for California's General and Special Funds, as well as revenue forecasts for sales, income, and corporate taxes for the period from 1969 to 2007. This time period includes six economic downturns that are always a challenge to revenue forecasters. Assuming the loss function is symmetric, the traditional tests reject the unbiased revenue forecast hypothesis 70 percent of the time. It appears state revenue forecasters tend to underestimate revenue changes. The null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between revenue forecast errors and information available at the time the forecast. This was rejected in 56 percent of the cases examined.
These results are similar to and who find a systematic underestimation of revenues forecasts for New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. 2 Once the asymmetry of the loss function is taken into account, however, the results change dramatically. First, the estimated loss function asymmetry parameter indicates that underestimating tax revenues is less costly for the vast majority of forecasts evaluated than overestimating tax revenues. Second, rationality can be rejected in only one case. California forecasters appear to produce conservative tax revenue forecasts and use available information efficiently. These results suggest that previous work evaluating tax revenue forecasting may have drawn misleading conclusions about forecast rationality.
They differ from Mocan and Azad (1995) who examine a panel of 20 states covering the period 1985 to 1992 but find no systematic under-or over-prediction in general fund revenues. All of the empirical tests find a correlation between forecast errors and information available at the time the forecast.
Based on these results, revenue forecasts do not appear to be rational. ` This paper is organized in the following manner. The first section defines rational forecasts and addresses how to implement the tests. The second section discusses the budget process in California and data issues. Section three presents the results.
DEFINING AND TESTING FORECAST RATIONALITY

A. Symmetric Loss Function
The rational expectations approach has been used to evaluate a wide range of macroeconomic forecasts. This approach typically assumes that the forecast loss function is quadratic and symmetric. It is popular in the forecast evaluation literature because it has the attractive property that the optimal or rational forecast is the conditional expectation which implies forecasts are unbiased (Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmermann, 2005) . Rationality assumes that all information available to the forecaster is used.
Complicating the analysis, the actual data used by the forecaster is not known by the researcher. Without this data, researchers test whether the observed forecast is an unbiased predictor of the economic variable of interest.
The first test examines forecasts of the change in revenues from one fiscal year to the next. Regression (1) tests whether the observed forecasted change in revenues is an unbiased predictor of the actual change in revenues.
(1) R t+h = α + βF t h + μ t Here R t+h equals the percentage change in tax revenues from period t to period t+h. In this paper the change is from one fiscal year to the next. F t h equals the forecasted hperiod ahead percentage change in tax revenues made in period t. α and β are parameters to be estimated. μ t is the error term of the regression. An unbiased revenue forecast implies the joint null hypothesis that α=0 and β=1. Rejecting this joint hypothesis is a rejection of the idea the forecast is unbiased.
The second test for rationality requires that forecasters use available relevant information optimally. This notion is tested by regressing the forecast error in period t on relevant information available at the time the forecast. This test is represented by regression (2).
(2) ε t = γ + η 1 X t + η 2 X t-1 + ν t Where ε t equals the forecast error in period t. X t and X t-1 represent information available to the forecaster at time t and t-1. They also provide an alternative test for forecast rationality. They apply these tests to IMF and OECD forecasts of budget deficits for the G7 countries. Their results suggest there is little evidence against rationality once asymmetry is taken into account.
Capistrán-Carmona (2008) applies this approach to evaluate the Federal Reserve's inflation forecasts. Earlier work in this area rejected rationality (Romer and Romer, 2000) . However, once the asymmetry of the loss function is taken into account, the Federal Reserve's inflation forecasts appear to be rational. This paper will apply this approach to the evaluation of California's tax revenue forecasts. Equation three is the flexible loss function used in this paper.
Where L(ε t+h , φ) is the loss function which depends on the forecast error and asymmetry parameter φ. 1 ( ε t+h<0) is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one when the forecast error is negative and zero otherwise. The parameter p is set equal to two, implying the flexible loss function is quadratic (see Capistrán-Carmona for a discussion).
This also allows φ to be identified for estimation.
Capistrán-Carmona (2008) shows that the relative cost of a forecast error can be estimated as φ / 1 -φ. If φ were to equal .75, then under-forecasting revenues would be 3 times more costly than over-forecasting revenues. If φ equals .20, then the cost of underprediction is one-fourth the cost of an equivalent over-prediction. The parameter φ has the following interpretation. When φ = .5 the loss function is symmetric. When φ>.5, under-prediction is more costly than over-prediction. Finally, if φ<.5, then overprediction is more costly than under-prediction (see Elliott, Komunjer, and Timmermann, 2005) . If under-predicting tax revenues is less costly than over-predicting tax revenues, a conservative bias will be present and φ should be significantly less than .5.
In order to derive the orthgonality condition associated with a rational forecast and get an estimate of φ, we assume that tax revenue forecasters minimize the expected loss function conditional on information available at the time the forecast. This results in an orthgonality condition:
In (4) ω t is a subset of all available information. (ε t+h -(1 -2φ) | ε t+h |) is referred to as the generalized forecast error. The actual forecast error is adjusted for the degree of asymmetry and the absolute size of the forecast error. Under asymmetric loss, rationality requires that the generalized forecast error rather than the actual forecast error be independent of the information available to the forecaster. Tests using the actual forecast error result in an omitted variable problem that leads to biased coefficients and standard errors (Capistrán-Carmona, 2008 ). (1982) is used to get a consistent estimate of φ.
The Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM) developed by Hansen
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BUDGET PROCESS AND DATA
When more than one variable from the information set is used as an instrumental variable in estimation, the model is overidentified and Hansen's J-test can be used to test if the orthgonality condition holds for these variables.
The California constitution requires the governor to submit a budget to the legislature by January 10th during the preceding fiscal year. For example, Governor
Brown submitted his 2011-2012 fiscal year budget on January 10, 2011. Included in the budget is a revenue estimate for the 2011-2012 fiscal year for the general fund and special fund. It includes disaggregated revenue forecasts for various tax revenue categories. Following discussions with the legislature and the collection of additional data on the economy, a revised revenue estimate is made by May 14th. The legislature must approve the budget by a two-thirds majority. The governor is required to sign a balanced budget by June 15th. 6 Budget disagreements between members of the legislature and between the legislature and the governor may delay the final approval of the budget beyond June 15th.
The actual revenue data and both sets of revenue forecasts examined here come from the governor's budget proposal for each year. 7 For regressions that test whether forecast errors are independent of available information, for the January forecast using monthly data, I include the percentage change in the variable of interest between November-September and September-July of the preceding year in the regression. For data available on a quarterly basis, I include the percentage change in the variable of interest between third-second quarters and secondfirst quarters of the preceding year in the regression.
Since data on the economy is provided on a calendar basis, it is necessary to make an assumption as to the data available at the time of the forecast. For the January forecast, I assume forecasters have a fairly good idea of the state of the economy for the previous year. However, to be safe I
include lagged values of the economic data available to forecasters. Clearly for the May revision, it would be unreasonable to assume they know how the economy will perform over the entire current year. However, they do know last year's data and the first quarter of the current year.
For tests of the May forecast using data that is available on a monthly basis, I
include I do not know all of the information used in making the actual forecast. I choose a set of national and state level variables to capture the behavior of the economy that would be available to forecasters at the time of the revenue forecast. I use the growth rate in real GDP, the consumer price index, and an index that measures economic activity in the technology sector, which is important for California, to measure national economic conditions. 8 For the California economy, I use state level values for the growth in unemployment, population, and personal income. business cycle conditions just prior to the forecast. 10 Political factors may also influence revenue forecasts. I include three political dummy variables to take this into account. The first dummy variable equals one if the governor is Republican and is zero otherwise. This captures Republican control of the executive branch and a divided government.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The second dummy variable equals one in an election year and is zero otherwise. The third political dummy variable equals one during the first year of a governor's term and is zero otherwise (see , , Bretschneider and Gorr (1992) , and Macan and Azad (1995)).
A. Summary Statistics
Revenue forecasts for the general fund, special fund, sales tax, income tax, and corporate tax are evaluated for the period 1969 to 2007. 12 Figure 1 illustrates the forecast error for each revenue category over the sample period. The revenue error is calculated as the actual percentage change in a revenue category from one fiscal year to the next minus the government's forecasted change in that revenue category over the same period.
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We can draw three observations from Figure 1 . First, forecast errors appear to be largest during recessions. It should come as no surprise that business cycle turning points make revenue forecasting difficult. Second, and also not surprising, the January forecast errors are generally larger than the May forecast errors. The additional five months of data on the economy improves forecasts. Third, the forecasted revenue tends to be less than actual revenue during expansions and greater than actual revenues during recessions.
In other words, budget forecasters tend to under predict changes in revenues.
This can also be seen from the revenue forecast error summary presented in Table   1 . In all cases except the January sales tax forecast, the errors are positive on average.
The general fund forecast error is significantly different from zero. While the average percentage change in general fund revenues was 8.3 percent over the entire sample period, the average January forecast error was 2.4 percent. The May forecast error is half that amount. 14 The general fund forecast error is almost double the mean forecast error found in Macan and Azad (1995) . However, in the latter case, it is an average error over 20 states. The California general fund forecast error is nearly four time larger than the mean forecast error reported in Rogers and Joyce (1996) for all 50 states.
B. Symmetric Loss Function
Both regressions 1 and 2 assume the loss function is symmetric. They are estimated using ordinary least squares. Because the regression error term is likely to follow a serially correlated moving average process, the standard errors are estimated using the approach suggested by Newey and West (1987 Each estimate of φ is significantly different form zero at the one percent level. In 32 of the 40 estimates of φ, the parameter estimate is significantly less than .5 at the one percent level. For the January general fund forecast, estimates of φ range from a low of .20 to a high of .31. These results suggest under-prediction is less costly than overprediction. With φ equal to .20, the cost of under-prediction is one-fourth the cost of an equivalent over-prediction. For the May general fund forecast, estimates of φ are higher but still significantly less than .5. Only the January sales tax revenue forecast and five of the corporate tax estimates fail to reject the null hypothesis that φ equals .5. These results support the idea that over-estimating the general fund, income tax, the May sales tax, and the special fund appears to be more costly than under-forecasting tax revenues.
Overall, the general and special fund forecasts are conservative. These results provide specific evidence and generally support the conclusion that tax revenue forecasters view an under-forecast as being less costly than an over-forecast.
The second question concerns whether forecasters use information about the economy efficiently, whether forecasts are rational. The test results under an asymmetric loss function are dramatically different compared to the results that assumed a symmetric loss function. In all but one model estimated, the generalized forecast error is independent of the variables included in the information set, suggesting that forecasters use information about the economy efficiently; the forecasts are rational.
These results differ from previous studies that failed to allow for asymmetry in the forecast loss function. Because of the lower costs associated with under-predicting revenues, California tax revenue forecasters tend to have a conservative bias. In addition, they appear to efficiently incorporate information on the economy that is available at the time the forecasts are made.
CONCLUSION
I first examine forecast rationality assuming a symmetric loss function using data from California. Regressions were estimated to test whether the revenue forecast is unbiased. Additional tests were conducted to determine if the actual forecast errors are uncorrelated with information available at the time of the forecast. The unbiased forecast hypothesis was rejected in seven out of ten cases. In addition, actual forecast errors are correlated with available information in 28 of the 50 cases.
Once the asymmetry of the loss function is taken into account, the results are significantly different. The estimate of the asymmetry parameter generally indicates the under-predicting revenue is less costly than over-prediction. Furthermore, there is nearly no evidence against the rationality hypothesis. These results indicate that failure to control for possible asymmetry in the loss function in previous work may have produced misleading results.
While California's tax revenue forecasts appear to be conservative and rational, it would be a mistake to generalize this evidence for other states. Past research has drawn different conclusions using different states and periods. In addition, California is a state with a large budget and they may devote more resources to revenue forecasting than other states. The * superscript on a coefficient indicates a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals .5 versus the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is less than .5. Each estimate is based on an alternative set of instrumental variables. Set A includes a constant and forecast errors lagged 1 and 2 periods. Set B includes a constant, forecast errors lagged 1 and 2 periods, lagged CA unemployment, lagged CA personal income, and lagged CA population. Set C includes a constant, forecast errors lagged 1 and 2 periods, lagged tech pulse index, lagged CPI inflation, and lagged real GDP growth. Set D includes a constant, forecast errors lagged 1 and 2 periods, the CA coincidence index, and the U.S. coincidence index.
